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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
EFFECT OF UNDUE INFLUENCE BY BENEFICIARY
OF INSURANCE POLICY
Courts have been reluctant to recognize the use of undue influence'
in making a change of beneficiaries in insurance policies. There are
comparatively few cases where undue influence has been considered a
material issue and in those cases the standard whereby undue influence
was found is not clearly determinable. Moreover, the type of the par-
ticular policy in question affects the problem of undue influence used
to effect a change of beneficiaries.
The subject of excessive importunities and changes of beneficiaries
in insurance policies is best approached by considering the standards
established in similar cases involving wills and contracts, and by com-
paring these with the standard established ift insurance cases. When
undue influence is pleaded in will contests and contract actions, the
courts readily consider the effect of such influence upon the will or
contract in question.
In Evenson v. Rust2 it was determined that the undue influence in
changing the beneficiary of a will had to amount to moral coercion,
destruction of free will and of independent action, and a disposal of
property contrary to the will and wishes of the testator. In this case,
as in all such cases, the mental condition of the parties in question was
seriously considered and an apparently severe standard was set up to
support the finding that the testator was of strong mental condition.
In Skinsrud v. Schwenn3 another will contest, the manner of proving
this destruction of free agency was reduced to a formula containing
four elements. There were: (1) opportunity to exercise undue influ-
ence, (2) disposition to influence and motive therefor, (3) suscepti-
bility of the subject to influence by the person having the opportunity,
(4) a result indicating the exercise of undue influence by such person.
The Will of Nachtsheim4 case enumerates the same elements and all
the latter cases are based on substantially the same standard. The Elliot
v. Fisk5 case contains a modification of this rule. The important fact
'Flone v. Fjone, 16 N.D. 100, 112 N.W. 70 (1907). "One party may occupy
a position or sustain such a relation to the other as to be able without any
actual force, physically, to so far control the will of the other as to really
constitute an overmastery of the mind and render. him unable to resist his
importunities. The law recognizes that to a certain extent, in the relation of
husband and wife, parent and child, attorney and client, nurse with the sick
or one in charge of an imbecile, the former in each instance has a measurable
power over the mind of the latter, and it requires that no undue or excessive
importunity shall be made the means of securing a beneficial contract or con-
veyance and the excessive exercise of this natural control is called 'undue
influence'."
2152 Wis. 113, 139 N.W. 766 (1913).
3 158 Wis. 142, 147 N.W. 370 (1914).
4166 Wis. 556, 164 N.W. 994 (1918).
5 162 Wis. 249, 155 N.W. 110 (1916).
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of that case was that an aged father and other relatives were excluded
from a will that gave all the property to an unrelated person. While a
disposition on the part of the beneficiary to exercise undue influence
was not clearly proven, yet, the court held that the other three elements
were shown to exist and that only three of the four elements need be
proven at any time.6
Responsibility of proving undue influence in will contests falls
upon the one contesting the will 7 In Graham v. Courtwright,8 the pre-
sumption of undue influence and fiduciary relations are discussed and
the court found that the existence of a fiduciary relationship does not
change the burden of proof. One, however, who draws up a will and
who is also a beneficiary of a considerable amount and not a blood
relative is viewed with suspicionY
Thus, in will contests, the doctrine of what constitutes undue in-
fluence and how it is to be proven is definite. Emphasis is always on the
state of mind of the testator, 0 but there must be accompanying proof
of attendant circumstances, and this is done by proving the elements
of undue influence as found in the Skinsrud case31
Contract cases on this subject differ from will contests only in the
degree of proof necessary. In will contests it is the interest of a third
party that is involved and in contract cases, it is the interest of a con-
tracting party. The natural tendency is to give a contracting party more
consideration, and, consequently, the amount of proof necessary will
not be as great in contract cases as in will contests.
Nevertheless, the influence to be undue must result in the destruc-
tion of free agency of the person acted upon and in the substitution of
6 In the Skinsrud case, the son of the testator got one half of the estate and
three daughters received nothing. But, the court held there was no disposi-
tion to exercise undue influence nor was there a causal connection between
the result and the influence. Stress was laid on the mental condition of the
testator. In Ball v. Boston, 153 Wis. 27, 141 N.W. 8 (1913), a husband and
wife relationship was not enough to constitute an opportunity to exercise an
influence that would be undue.
7 Ball v. Boston, 153 Wis. 27, 141 N.W. 8 (1913). Relationship resulting from
a child's lifelong faithfulness and kindness to a parent does not cast upon the
child, as a beneficiary in the parent's will the burden of proving that the will
was without influence. In re Boyle's Will, 186 Iowa 216, 172 N.W. 280 (1919).6 180 Iowa 394, 161 N.W. 774 (1917). "The doctrine that undue influence is to
be presumed as between parties inter vivos, dealing with each other when
fiduciary relations exist between them, has no application to testamentary
gifts." Pirkle v. Ellenberger, 179 Iowa 1122, 162 N.W. 791 (1917).
9 Hughes v. Meredith, 24 Ga. 325, 71 Am. Dec. 127 (1858).
'DIn Davidson v. Davidson, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 90, 96 N.W. 409 (1901) where the
testator excluded his children of the first marriage, "to keep peace in the
family, although the children were all alike to him." This statement was ad-
missible, but there had to be other proof of coercion. In re Allen's Estate, 230
Mich. 584, 203 N.W. 479 (1925); In re Kirschbaum's Estate, 242 Mich. 291,
218 N.W. 660 (1928).
1 Supra note 6.
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the will of another person for his own.12 In Holmes v. Hill,13 the court
looked for evidence of fraud, unfairness, or design on the part of the
one accused of exercising undue influence, and for evidence of surprise,
imbecility or weakness on the part of the contractor, holding that these
were the characteristics of cases in equity where courts felt warranted
in interposing between the strong and weak. Fjone v. Fjone14 contains
the same idea of protection against the weak and further indicates the
tendency of the courts to watch closely for undue influence in contracts.
This is evident from the fact that the doctrine of fiduciary relationship
is readily applied when one is in the position of advantage as a result
of a relationship of confidence or trust. Then, proof that no undue
influence existed rests on the one holding the position of trust. Of
course, the existence of such relationship must be first established.'5
In the Graham case:1 it was shown that this doctrine is not applicable
to cases of testamentary gifts.
Thus we find a similarity in the concept of undue influence as
applied in will and contract cases and a common emphasis on the men-
tal condtion of the one allegedly influenced, although, in contract cases,
the opportunity to exercise influence receives more stress than in will
cases. The authority of many cases involving undue influence in the
making of contracts, includes many citations of will cases as in Hult v.
Home Life Ins. Co. of New York' which is evidence of a tendency to
look to the doctrine in the will contests as a possible standard.
The problem of undue influence occurs in insurance cases only
where there has been a change of beneficiary. Not even in all cases of
changes can the problem arise, because only the original beneficiary is
recognized in cases of life insurance policies, unless there is a reserva-
12 Hult v. Home Life Ins. Co. of New York, 213 Iowa 573, 240 N.W. 218 (1932) ;
Drinkwine v. Gruelle, 120 Wis. 628, 98 N.W. 534 (1904) modifies the standard
by saying there must be at least an impairment of free agency, but showing
the existence of ill feeling is not enough.
1322 Neb. 425, 35 N.W. 206 (1887). Hill who had befriended Holmes, years
later aided Holmes in getting his mother's estate by paying transportation costs
and giving Holmes the use of his residence. A contract, permitting Hill to
use $25,000 of the money was not considered the result of undue influence
from the circumstances.
14 16 N.D. 100, 112 N.W. 70 (1907). "Courts of equity will carefully scrutinize
transactions . . . and will not hesitate to reach out their strong arm in pro-
tection of the weaker against the stronger mind, where an inequitable or un-
conscionable bargain has been obtained through improper or undue influence."
35Utterback v. Hollingsworth, 208 Iowa 300, 225 N.W. 419 (1929). "It must
appear expressly or by implication that trust or confidence was reposed. The
supposed trustee must be shown to have been in a position of advantage or
superiority such as to imply a dominating influence." In O'Neil v. Morrison,
211 Iowa 416, 233 N.W. 708 (1930) it was held that a situation wherein a
daughter aided her father by caring for him in her home after an accident
does not constitute a fiduciary relationship.
26 Supra note 8.
v 213 Iowa 573, 240 N.W. 218 (1932).
[Vol. 23
tion in the policy allowing a change.'8 This immediate vesting of inter-
est in life insurance policies applies also to endowment, accumulation,
and tontine policies."9 In Foster v. Gile Administrator,2 0 there is a sub-
stantial modification in the Wisconsin law which allows a change of
beneficiaries of a life insurance policy by the insured if he pays the
premiums.
The interest of a beneficiary of a fraternal benefit certificate is very
contingent, since a change can be made at any time by the insured as
long as there is a compliance with any regulations or provisions made
by the insurance company.2 ' Therefore, the problem of undue influence
in insurance cases can arise in cases of fraternal benefit certificates and
generally in life insurance policies where a provision reserving the right
to make a change of beneficiary is made.
In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Andrews, 2 the court states that the
influence to be undue in making a change of beneficiary must approach
the point of depriving the insured of his or her free agency and such
fraud must be directed toward the end of affecting a transfer. The
proof should be reasonably clear and convincing. Here, again, the
destruction of free agency is the prime element. Further, the undue
influence must be directed, and intentional-which brings in the ele-
ment of intent to influence unduly. This is a considerably stronger
element than the "disposition" to influence unduly necessary in will
cases, but it is similar to the "design" looked for in the Holmes v. HillP
contract case. In some cases where opportunity apparently existed the
courts held that the situation did not constitute an exercise of undue
18 In Central Nat. Bank of Washington City v. Hume, 128 U.S. 195, 9 Sup. Ct
41, 32 L.ed. 370 (1888) it was held that a policy and the money to become
due under it belong at the moment it is issued, to the person or persons named
in it as the beneficiary or beneficiaries; and there is no power to transfer by
act or deed. North American Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 111 Mass. 542 (1873).
19 Condon v. New York Life Ins. Co., 183 Iowa 658, 166 N.W. 452, 19 A.L.R.
649 (1918). Endowntent-Lambert v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 50 La. Ann.
1027, 24 So. 16 (1898). Tontine-New York Life Ins. Co. v. Ireland (Texas
1891) 17 S.W. 617, 14 L.R.A. 278; Smith v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 222 Penn.
226, 20 L.R.A. (N.s.) 928, 128 Am. St. Rep. 799 (1908).
- 50 Wis. 603, 7 N.W. 555 (1880).
21 Malancy v. Malancy, 165 Wis. 642, 163 N.W. 186 (1917) ; Estate of Breiting,
78 Wis. 33, 47 N.W. 17 (1890). "Benefit certificates give no vested interest
before death. Payment of premiums by beneficiary is immaterial." Preusser
v. The Supreme Hive of the Ladies of the Maccabees of the World, 123 Wis.
164, 101 N.W. 358 (1904).
22 167 Ill. App. 182 (1912). The fact that the father of the new beneficiary had
seduced the insured when she was only eighteen years of age and had car-
ried on illicit relations until death of insured did not amount to undue influ-
ence. It is interesting to note that all the decisions referred to as authority
in this case are will contests-which is an indication as in the contract cases
that the courts look to the standard set up in will contests involving undue
influence.
23 22 Neb. 425, 35 N.W. 206 (1887).
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influence such as a continuation of illicit relations.2 ' But in Savage v.
McCauley the court found undue influence where the landlady of the
deceased insured cared for him in his weakened condition and became
the new beneficiary. Emphasis was placed on the weakened mental
condition in that case and also in Burke v. Bay28 where a practitioner
of Christian Science affiliations was constantly present at the side of
the dying insured and allegedly aided the new beneficiary in prevailing
upon the insured to change the beneficiary in the policy.
Insurance policies are considered contracts and undue influence
vitiates them.2 But they also have most of the characteristics of a will
as far as third party interests are concerned, so that it is natural in
insurance cases involving undue influence to find a combination of
standards of proof as found in contract and will cases. First, the result
must be the destruction of free agency and substitution of a will for
that of the insured. Then, as in contract cases, there must be shown a
design, that is, an intention to influence unduly for purpose of affecting
a particular change of beneficiaries, and, finally a fact situation that
presents ample opportunity to influence. The burden of proof remains
on the contestant, since insurance cases are similar to cases involving
testamentary gifts. And, at all times, the mental condition of the
insured and his susceptibility to influence are considered of primary
importance.
JOHN B. FRiscH.
24 Gerst v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 11 Ohio App. 382 (1917). Free
agency would not be substantially impaired in a case such as this.
25 (Mass. 1938) 16 N.E. (2d) 639.
26164 Minn. 331, 205 N.W. 219 (1925). It is to be noted that the burden of proof
in case of allegations of undue influence is upon the plaintiff alleging it.
Wherry v. Latimer, 103 Miss. 524, 60 So. 642 (1913) ; Eyestone v. Eyestone,
103 Akla. 301, 299 Pac. 518 (1924).
27 Cason v. Owens, 100 Ga. 142, 28 S.E. 75 (1897).
